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The Success of the Light
Armoured Vehicle
Frank Maas

T

he seeds for Canada’s purchase
of the Light Armoured Vehicle
(LAV) lie as far back as 1964, when
the Defence White Paper called for
the creation of a force equipped with
a flexible, light, and air-transportable
vehicle to serve in UN missions. This
resulted in a confused reaction that
saw the Canadian Forces (CF) looking
for a replacement tank for their troops
in NATO while also trying to find a
vehicle to serve with the UN, while
the government was not willing to
make the investment to procure either
type.1 Sean Maloney argues that the
1971 Defence White Paper, Defence
in the 70s, released by the Trudeau
government, was the turning point
in the shift from tracked to wheeled
vehicles in the CF.2 The salient point
was that the existing armoured
vehicles were nearing the end of
their operational life and the military
had to have multi-purpose vehicles
that could reduce the pressure on
a limited defence budget.3 This was
combined with a growing sense in
Canada that the nation should avoid
high-intensity combat and focus on
humanitarian operations, and the
tank was not seen as a suitable vehicle
for these operations. Moreover, the
devastation of Israel’s tank forces
by modern anti-tank weapons in
the Yom Kippur War of 1973 caused
many to doubt the tank’s primacy
on the battlefield and whether it was
worth the high cost for such a one-

Abstract: Since the 1970s, budget
constraints and debates over the
tank’s relevance have prompted
the Canadian Forces (CF) to pursue
lighter, cheaper, and more flexible
vehicles. The Light Armoured Vehicle
(LAV), built in London, Ontario, has
been purchased in great numbers
to satisfy these demands, and it
has largely succeeded. The CF has
purchased the LAV as a wheeled,
multi-purpose vehicle to fulfill a
variety of roles (infantry carrier,
medical evacuation vehicle, etc.),
that is cheaper and easier to maintain
than tracked alternatives. The CF has
continued to purchase LAVs because
they have been successful in the field,
and they support a domestic producer,
General Dynamics Land Systems
Canada (GDLS-C), that cooperates
closely with the military.

dimensional vehicle.4 In this context,
the Trudeau government purchased
114 Leopard I tanks in 1978 to replace
the 500 Centurions procured by the
Canadian Army in the 1950s,5 but
the Army still needed a vehicle for
the reserves.
Faced with the urgent need for
new vehicles and uncertainty about
the nature of future operations, the
Canadian military tried to choose a
flexible vehicle.6 With a shrinking
defence budget, economy was an
important reason why in 1974 the CF
decided to pursue wheeled, light, and
multi-purpose vehicles. The contract
seemed destined to go to the American
light armoured vehicle manufacturer
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Cadillac-Gage, but the owner of
Swiss firm MOWAG, Walter Ruf,
came to the Department of National
Defence (DND) in Ottawa to present
his company’s new vehicle design,
the “Piranha.”7 DND indicated that
the vehicle must be built in Canada to
have a chance of winning the bid, and
the Swiss company solicited Diesel
Division General Motors (DDGM),
which had no military experience,
but manufactured heavy equipment,
to do assembly and steel fabrication
work at their plant in London if
the Piranha was selected. A multinational competition was launched
in 1976 for the Armoured Vehicle
General Purpose (AVGP) program,
a six-wheeled vehicle with four
variants, and the Piranha was selected
in March 1976 for the contract. Only
three variants were produced: the
Grizzly infantry carrier, the Cougar
fire support vehicle, and the Husky
maintenance vehicle. These vehicles
were lightly armoured compared
to tanks, and were intended to be
training vehicles that might conduct
peacekeeping or internal security
operations. Production began in
1977, and DDGM assembled the
vehicle and manufactured large steel
components.
A total of 269 Grizzlies were
built for the AVGP program and the
vehicle was used mainly for reserves
training in its prime role as an
infantry carrier. Some units have been
27
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Top: Three variants of the Armoured Vehicle General Purpose
(AVGP), a six-wheeled vehicle, were introduced into Canadian
service in 1976. (l. to r.) the Cougar fire support vehicle, the Grizzly
infantry carrier, and the Husky maintenance vehicle.
Bottom: Cougar armoured vehicles from the Kelowna- and Vernonbased British Columbia Dragoons drive through the early morning
light and dust. The Cougars are in the US Army training area of
Yakama, Washington as part of Exercise Cougar Salvo held in
March 2004.
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life-extended to serve
alongside the later
Coyote and LAV‑III
as maintenance and
recovery vehicles in
Afghanistan.8 The 195
Cougars delivered
were equipped with a
76 mm main gun and
a 7.62 mm machine
gun to support
infantry, 9 and these
vehicles were given
to reserve armoured
regiments, but
some were pressed
into peacekeeping
missions. There were
27 Huskies built and
these maintenance
and recovery vehicles
still see active service
in that role. 10 All
the AVGP units
were from ten to 13
tonnes, with armour
protection designed
to withstand fire up
to a 7.62 mm machine
gun. 11
The AVGP vehicles
were welcomed by the
reserves. 12 The First
Hussars regimental
history described
the Cougar as a
“godsend” because it
was a credible tanktrainer in contrast
to the machine-gun
armed jeeps that
had been used; it
improved the morale
and retention of
personnel.13 Corporal
Mark Fitz-Gerald of
the First Hussars,
who has deployed
to Afghanistan,
told the author that
basic maintenance
was easy; drivers
could access the
engines quickly and

do much of the basic work. Chief
Warrant Officer Jonathan Kisslinger
of the same unit, who served in
Bosnia in 1994 and more recently in
Afghanistan, added that cleaning of
the weapons systems was also easy.
There were, however, significant
shortcomings. Fitz-Gerald described
the AVGPs as being physically tight
– for example, the turret was cramped
in the Cougar, and maps, binoculars,
and other equipment cluttered the
space. The smell was often bad, as
soldiers in heavy uniforms sweated
and the fumes of weapons discharges
filled the turret. Infantry in the Grizzly
were crowded in the back, and jostled
because the suspension of AVGP
units was primitive compared to later
vehicles. The vision ports were often
blocked, and there were no cameras
to give infantry points of reference.
Fitz-Gerald stated that riding in the
back of the AVGP was nauseating,
especially when training runs lasted
up to two hours. Deployment was
difficult because infantry had to
scramble out of small doors in the
back, and were disoriented from the
lack of reference points within the
vehicle. The AVGP did not have any
air conditioning, which made the
vehicle very uncomfortable in hot
weather.14 Kisslinger said that there
was limited exterior vision when
the vehicle was “hatches down,”
as Army doctrine dictates, during
combat. Staying coordinated and
in line with the other vehicles was
difficult. The Cougar’s gun was not
stabilized, and the vehicle had to be
fully stopped or moving slowly for
it to fire accurately. Having only two
steerable wheels hampered the ability
of the AVGP to turn in rutted roads
or bad conditions, and also caused
uneven weight dispersal.
Cougars were deployed to
Somalia and Bosnia, and came under
serious criticism for lack of armour
protection, mobility, and firepower,
hardly surprising in view of their
design for training and low intensity
operations.15 The vehicles were sent
2
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into active service with few spare
parts because as training vehicles,
they did not require the same level of
maintenance as a front-line vehicle.16
Kisslinger, nevertheless, emphasized
that the Cougar showed considerable
robustness in Bosnia. Its armour was
generally proof against 7.62 mm
bullets (depending on where they
struck the vehicle and from what
range), and the vehicle’s high speed
offered a degree of protection from
anti-vehicle weapons. They also
survived mine-blasts.17
After the success of the AVGP
in Canada, the federal government
suggested that DDGM look to
export the Piranha to capitalize on
its new plant in London.18 DDGM
made strong sales, to the United
States Marine Corps, Saudi Arabian
National Guard, Australia, and New
Zealand, in addition to continued
orders from the Canadian Forces. In
1999 Diesel Division General Motors
of Canada was renamed GM Defence
in recognition of its expanded
military business responsibilities.
Then, in 2003 after its acquisition by
General Dynamics, it became General
Above right: Grizzly and Husky armoured
vehicles arrive in Dakar, Senegal aboard
a Dutch commercial ship, 12 August
2005. Canada provided 105 armoured
vehicles, training and maintenance
assistance, and personal protective
equipment in support of the efforts of
the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) to bring peace and stability to the
Darfur region. The 100 “Grizzly” general
purpose armoured vehicles and five
“Husky” armoured recovery vehicles are
being used by AU troops from Nigeria,
Rwanda and Senegal.

Dynamics Land Systems – Canada
(DGLS-C).19
It was Canadian needs that drove
the most significant development of
the AVGP, the LAV‑III. As always,
financial considerations played a
leading part. With the end of the Cold
War, the Canadian government was
particularly determined to realize
a “peace dividend” in the face of
soaring budget deficits. This was the
reason for the precipitate withdrawal
of Canadian Forces in Europe starting
in 1992. Although the 1994 Defence
White Paper noted dangerous
volatilities in the international
situation following the Cold War,
its main theme was the need for
economy and flexibility: “In short, the
maintenance of multi-purpose forces
represents a pragmatic, sensible
approach to defence at a time of fiscal

restraint.” 20 The White Paper stated
emphatically that Canada could
not afford specialized equipment,
and would only purchase what
was absolutely necessary and easily
maintainable.21
Two of the requirements
highlighted in the White Paper were
renewal of the ageing fleet of tracked
armoured personnel carriers and the
replacement of the old Cougars. 22
The most recent American tracked
fighting vehicles, the M1 Abrams
main battle tank and the M2 Bradley
infantry fighting vehicle, were too
expensive. MOWAG had developed
the Piranha III from 1994-1995, which
was a much larger version of the
vehicle with a greater payload, better
armour and an improved suspension
and engine.23 With Canada’s previous
purchase of the AVGP and other LAV

CFJIC IS2005-3031, Photo by Marc Lacourse

CFJIC ISD01-1018, Photo by Sgt Gerry Pilote

Below right: Members of the 3rd
Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment (3 R22eR)
depart the Canadian platoon house in
their Grizzly infantry section vehicle for
their daily patrol, 12 November 2001.
The 3 R22eR Battlegroup is with Task
Force Bosnia-Herzegovina on Roto 9
of Operation PALLADIUM, Canada’s
contribution to the NATO Stabilization
Force (SFOR).
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variants, the political and financial
contexts, and most important,
Canada’s production capability,
the selection of the LAV‑III was a
predictable choice. DND decided on
a directed purchase of the vehicle (no
competition for the contract), which
meant that the government could
avoid the media scrutiny of a costly
and time-consuming competition for
a multi-billion dollar contract.24
An advantage of the well
established relationship between
DDGM and the Canadian Forces was
that DDGM could pick and choose
from the advances that MOWAG
designers had developed in light
of the CF’s particular needs and
preferences. According to William
Pettipas, a former executive director
of GM Diesel, the strength of MOWAG
was research and development, while
DDGM was better at integrated
vehicle design, especially the
cost-effective implementation of

upgrades. The two companies could
operate profitably without each
other, but could cooperate closely
when needed.25
The CF’s purchase was the
first sale of the LAV‑III by either
DDGM or MOWAG. Although
wheeled armoured vehicles were
not in vogue during the Cold War
with larger combatants, they offered
an attractive, cheaper alternative
for smaller nations. The shift in
military thinking after the Cold War
to faster, quicker fleets adapting to
multiple situations was beneficial
for the company. 26 Tom de Faye,
director of marketing and business
development, stated that the decline
of the Soviet threat reduced the need
for heavy armoured vehicles, but
increased the demand for cheaper,
more versatile vehicles. 27 In the
case of the LAV, the US Marine
Corps, a service comparable in
size and resources to the CF, had

demonstrated the vehicle’s capability
in such varied roles as air defence,
command and communications, and
as mortar carriers. Hopes in Canada
were that this flexibility, together
with the increased protection and
firepower of the LAV‑IIIs, might
make large savings possible by
forestalling the need to replace the
CF’s Leopard tanks. The government
was so cost-conscious and concerned
about public perception of large
investments in armoured vehicles
that it bought the LAV‑III in batches
to hide the total cost of the program.28
DDGM started manufacturing
the first batch of 240 LAV‑IIIs for
the Canadian Forces in 1998, and
a wargame that same year, “Iron
Renaissance,” compared the LAV‑III
against the other APC of the Canadian
Army, the M113. The study found
that the LAV‑III was much more
effective and versatile than the M113
despite some limitations in mobility

Local Afghan children wave as Canadian soldiers from Task Force Kandahar pass by in a LAV III, January 2011.
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the LAV type was originally
designed, in Ethiopia and
Eritrea, the Balkans, and
Haiti, but has also seen a
great deal of combat with
the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)
i n A f g h a n i s t a n . 32 T h e
Canadian Army realized
quickly that it needed heavy
vehicles to combat the
Taliban insurgency, and
sent additional LAV‑IIIs and
Bison armoured vehicles
after first deploying.33 Yet the
Taliban has used increasingly
powerful roadside bombs
and weapons, and no vehicle
is immune.34 The goal of the
insurgents is not necessarily
to destroy the vehicle, but
to kill the personnel inside
it; the high pressure of
large anti-tank mines or
other bombs can savage the
troops inside any vehicle.
Since the middle of 2006,
LAV‑IIIs have come under
more frequent attack by the
Above right: A Coyote armoured
reconnaissance vehicle
watches the perimeter of the
Kandahar airfield. The mastmounted radar of the Coyote’s
surveillance system scans for
suspicious activity and can
“see” up to 24 kilometres away.
Photo taken in March 2002.

CFJIC APD02 5000-134, Photo by Cpl Lou Penny

on soft ground and vulnerability
against anti-armour weapons. In the
study, a Canadian battlegroup fought
against an opposing motor rifle
regiment with Soviet-style tactics in
a defensive and offensive battle. The
LAV‑III’s 25 mm cannon allowed it
to engage threats at a greater range
than the M113’s heavy machine gun,
and the vehicle’s total enclosure of
the crew reduced casualties because
it protected them from artillery and
indirect fire.29 The LAV‑III’s speed,
acceleration, and mobility, combined
with the firepower of its 25 mm
cannon and carrying capacity for
specialized infantry weapons made
it a more capable vehicle.30 Although
the LAV‑III could not manoeuvre
easily in the presence of enemy tanks,
it incurred fewer losses and inflicted
greater damage on the opponent than
the M113.31
The experience of Corporal
Fitz-Gerald and Master Warrant
Officer Kisslinger with the LAV‑III
contrasted to the AVGP usefully
highlights developments in design
and performance. Kisslinger said
that the LAV‑III’s hydropneumatic
suspension was much superior to
previous vehicles, and allowed
operation at higher speed with
better crew comfort. The engine was
more powerful, and technological
advancements, such as thermal
imagery, self-diagnostic maintenance
systems, and improved fire-control
made the LAV‑III much more
effective. The infantry compartment
was larger, and the sergeant’s camera
that displayed the area in front of the
vehicle reduced disorientation among
the embarked infantry, and allowed
them to deploy more effectively.
Fitz-Gerald added that the ramp
on the vehicle was a significant
improvement, allowing infantry to
deploy much faster. Finally, and
very importantly, the LAV‑III has air
conditioning, which is a significant
advantage in hot environments.
The LAV‑III has served in low
intensity operations of the type that

CFJIC ISO2010-4023-04

CFJIC AR2011-0025-121, Photo by Tina Gillies
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Below right: A Coyote provides
overwatch at the Vancouver
International Airport during the
2010 Summer Olympic Games.

Taliban. A Lesson Synopsis Report in
response to an Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) from May 2009 stated
that “no amount of armour could
prevent a catastrophic vehicle kill,”
and that the best method of defeating
IEDs is in proper reconnaissance
and route choice.35 As IED attacks
intensified, military commanders
reaffirmed the utility of the LAV‑III

and that no vehicle is immune.36 By
mid-2008, the Army was considering
replacing or upgrading the LAV‑III,
which has seen tough service in
Afghanistan, and was not designed
to meet threats like IEDs. Even so, the
vehicle’s capabilities and versatility
earned the confidence of its crews.37
Kisslinger stated that the LAV‑III
is robust, well-armed and popular
31
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Top left: Under a flag flying at half-mast
to mark the death of the Queen Mother,
a Bison infantry section vehicle brings
(from left) Vice Admiral Greg Maddison,
the deputy chief of the defence staff,
Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, the
commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry Battle Group, and LieutenantGeneral Mike Jeffrey, the chief of the
land staff, to the Canadian camp at
Kandahar International Airport to deliver
a briefing to the soldiers of the 3 PPCLI
Battle Group, 30 March 2002.

CFJIC VK2003-0121-05d, Photo by Roxanne Clowe

CFJIC IS2003-2493a, Photo by Frank Hudec

Middle left: A Canadian Forces Bison
maintenance and recovery vehicle sits
in a compound at night at the Canadian
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) camp in Kabul, Afghanistan, 13
July 2003.
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Bottom lef t: An armoured Bison
ambulance and its crew are serving
a six-month mission maintaining
a safe and secure environment in
Bosnia on Operation Palladium, a NATO
peace-support mission and Canada’s
contribution to peace in the Balkans.
This photo was taken in Velika Kladusa,
Bosnia-Herzegovina on 28 May 2003.

with personnel; Fitz-Gerald agreed
that the LAV‑III platform and its
technologies performed well in
Afghanistan.38
GDLS‑C has positioned itself
as the sole supplier of armoured
vehicles for the Canadian Forces,
and has adapted itself to Canada’s
particular context: budgetary
constraints even as the country
undertakes international military
missions in diverse challenging
environments. During the AVGP bid
of the 1970s, Army officers wanted to
re-equip the armoured forces with
a new main battle tank, but could
not overcome the government’s
unwillingness on the score of cost
and public perceptions of tanks as
offensive weapons inappropriate
to Canada’s foremost international
role as a peacekeeper. In the end
the Army had to settle for a limited
number of Leopard tanks, mainly
to sustain the armoured regiment
in Europe, and a larger number of
wheeled tank trainers that could

6
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US Army photo 2008-06-04-071324

perform in low-intensity operations,
such as internal security at home, and
peace-monitoring missions for the
UN. AVGPs were low-maintenance
compared to tracked vehicles,
particularly so because a common
platform filled multiple roles; troops
did not have to service a variety of
vehicles.
The AVGPs have been in service
for much longer than expected, and
have been continuously rebuilt and
re-roled. Colonel Fred Lewis boasted
in 2004 that the Canadian Army
was a NATO leader in converting
to faster, wheeled fleets that could
capitalize on enhanced intelligence
gathering capabilities and use their
speed to eliminate targets quickly.39
This continuing commitment to
wheeled vehicles as a primary
combat type was not intended. In
circumstances that echoed those
that surrounded the original AVGP
acquisition in the 1970s, the CF
bought the LAV‑III at a time of
severe financial stress, and acute
need for new equipment in the face
of uncertainty about requirements
in a rapidly changing international
environment. DDGM’s LAV‑III was
selected in 1995 because the company
had a strong record as a contractor for
the Canadian Forces. They had a new,
upgraded and capable vehicle whose
predecessor had proven itself. There
was commonality with many other
vehicles in Canadian service, and
the CF had combat and maintenance
personnel who were already familiar
with the LAV. The LAV‑III could
fulfill a variety of tactical roles, from
infantry to missile carriers, and it was
also upgradeable, which built on an
important element of the Canadian
Army’s relationship with the LAV
family: “platform improvement.”40
The Piranha family of Light
Armoured Vehicles manufactured in
London, Ontario has been a successful
military technology. Although
the market is demanding and
competitive, GDLS‑C has made itself

US Army photo 2007-12-21-093616
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Top: A US Army Stryker NBCRV (nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance
vehicle) is an NBC testing lab on wheels. Here it is on display at the Pentagon
in Washington, DC, December 2007.
Above: Soldiers from B Troop, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, fire a 120 mm
mortar from their Stryker during crew certification at Fort Lewis, Washington,
May 2008.

33

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4
Light Armoured Vehicles in foreign
service.
Left: An Australian LAV testing its
equipment on a practice range near
Tallil Air Base in Southern Iraq,
Below left: A Royal New Zealand LAV
participates in “JOINT KIWI 08,” an
exercise held on the South Island of
New Zealand and aimed at improving
interoperability with the Australian
military.

Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) photo 20071230adf8243116-311

ADOD photo 20080517ran8100279-175-drn
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United States Marine Corps Photograph

Bottom left: United States Marine Corps
scouts with the Light Armored Vehicle
platoon, 15th Marine Expeditionary
Unit take cover behind an LAV-25 prior
to beginning a trench assault in the
Jordanian desert during “Operation
Infinite Moonlight,” August 2008.

into the pre-eminent manufacturer of
light armoured vehicles, formerly a
European domain.41 From an original
design nearly 40 years old, GDLS‑C
and MOWAG have progressively
developed the armoured vehicle into
three distinct variants with many
capabilities. The original Piranhas
were light vehicles, approximately
ten tonnes, and recent updates of
the LAV have taken it to nearly 30
tonnes, to accommodate increases in
firepower, protection, engine power,
and technological innovation.42 The
company has been successful because
of the vehicle’s combat performance;
the LAV has acquitted itself well
and it is generally liked by its crews.
There have been problems, but no
vehicle is perfect.
However, selling the vehicle and
ensuring customers stay satisfied
requires more than just having a
good product. The foundation for
GDLS‑C’s success is its domestic
market: Canada. The CF’s purchase
of the AVGP was the London
company’s foothold on the light
armoured vehicle market, and
subsequent purchases have cemented
GDLS‑C’s role in the Canadian
defence establishment. DND has
found ways to support GDLS‑C
because it is the only manufacturer
of armoured vehicles in Canada
and is a significant industry. Under
8
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company, and enhance the credibility
of the producer.48
The LAV and GDLS‑C are
attractive because they reduce the
maintenance burden on militaries.
A high maintenance load can cripple
combat efficiency and budgets, and
the high cost of acquiring vehicles
means that combat platforms are
kept in service for a long time:
sometimes up to 30 years. The LAV
meets requirements for a reliable,
maintainable vehicle that can
perform a variety of roles. GDLS‑C’s
branch plant in Edmonton and

Defence contractors and militaries
have been forced to react to this
threat, and lately, GDLS‑C has
aggressively researched survivability
and armour upgrades to contend
against roadside bombs.50 GDLS‑C
has produced the LAV-H, which is a
technology demonstrator to show the
capabilities that can be achieved with
a refurbished LAV‑III. The LAV-H
was built with the experience and
recommendation of former operators
from Afghanistan.51 Improving the
vehicle with operator experience is
not a standardized process, rather an

US Army photo 45538-2009-07-22-100705

the Canada-US Defence Production
Sharing Agreement, moreover,
GDLS‑C can bid on US contracts
and be treated like a US company.
The Canadian government has also
actively assisted GDLS‑C in selling its
product.43 William Pettipas stated that
“soldiers are our best salespeople,”44
and the CF’s purchase and stamp of
approval on the LAV has paved the
way for large American contracts and
other foreign sales that have helped
the company grow.
The second aspect of GDLS‑C’s
success is the hiring of former or
reserve military personnel, a common
practice among defence contractors.45
William Pettipas was a military
officer for 28 years before joining
the company, 46 and his first-hand
knowledge of what soldiers need
and expect has helped the company
immensely. Designers, such as Mike
Stapleton, are reservists who have
trained and worked with LAVs, and
are aware of the sometimes unusual
requirements of military personnel.
This helps them to provide solutions
that address those requirements, and
the connection with military culture
and common “language” strengthens
the understanding between the CF
and GDLS‑C. An article in the Maple
Leaf described the experience of
GDLS‑C employee Mark Campbell,
who is in the Army Reserves. He
stated that the support he received
from the company was “absolutely
amazing,” and that GDLS‑C was very
good in accommodating its reservists
in pay and leaves. He noted there
are 16 employees in GDLS‑C who
are currently active in the reserves,
and that this enhances “a strong
understanding of military equipment
requirements from the perspective
of the end user.”47 William Pettipas
agrees that the hiring of former or
reserve military personnel is beneficial
for the design of the vehicle as well
as corporate relationships. Former
military personnel at the higher levels
of the company create understanding
between the purchasers and the

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

US Army soldiers patrol through Sab al Bour, a town north of
Baghdad, with a column of Strykers providing support, July 2009.

another workshop in London, and the
subcontractor Militex Coatings Inc
have done much of the refurbishment
and reworking for these vehicles. The
shared experience of the Canadian,
American, Australian, New Zealand,
and Saudi Arabian militaries reduces
the maintenance burden in NATO or
ABCA, and the LAV User Nations
Group was created to build on this
shared knowledge.49
Finally, the LAV is upgradeable, a
key requirement in an era of ceaseless
change. For example, the LAV‑III
was designed in the mid-1990s
with no anticipation of the threat
of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

informal series of discussions with
military personnel.52 Because it was
designed as a troop carrier, there is
room in the large compartment in
non-infantry variants for electronics
packages, or other equipment and
weapons such as mortars.
Since the LAV was first purchased
in the 1970s defence budgets have
continued to be tightly constrained
and the military has not enjoyed
the flexibility in procurement it
had during the Second World War
and the early Cold War. Rather, the
CF must economize while being
called upon to perform more varied
roles, even as more lethal threats
35
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dictate the employment of new,
costly technology. The LAV, despite
the age of its original design, has
been continually improved to meet
new demands, and its producer
has continually adapted itself to
respond effectively to its market and
customers.
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